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Each day more than twotrillion dollars, a sum e qual to almost one-fifth of the
American gross national product, is transferred by wire.2 The dollar volume of checks
processed in the United States alone exceeds 15 trillion dollars per year.3 The payment
systems that carry these vast amounts span the globe and are subject to a myriad of
sometimes-conflicting national laws.
With diverse laws governing a tremendous volume of trans-national payment
transactions that involve large sums of money, one would expect thatsome legal scholar
would have written a treatise about the comparative law of bank collections and payment
transactions. Yet, attorneys researching the laws that govern bank collections and
payment transactions in different countries have found a surprising paucity of works on
the subject.
While Professor Benjamin Geva's recent book, Bank Collections and Payment
Transactions,4 was not written as a practice guide, it will meet the needs of many
practitioners when presented with problems involving cross-border and offshore payment
transactions. This compact and scholarly book, which took seven years to write, provides
a thorough and accurate comparative analysis of the laws that govern bank collections
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and payment transactions in the United States, other common law countries, and in civil
law jurisdictions.
Although the scope of the book is limited – for example, preauthorized debit and
credit transfers and credit card payments are not discussed – the book covers a good deal
of material not presented in most other works on payment systems. The book compares
the laws governing bank collections and payment transactions in Australia, Canada, the
United Kingdom, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Africa, Switzerland and
the United States. It also discusses the Uniform Cheques Law (“U.C.L.”) of the Geneva
Conventions of 1932 and various directives of the European Union that pertain to
payment transactions and the bank-customer relationship.
Professor Geva is Professor of Law at Osgoode Hall Law School of York
University in Canada, and is unusually well-qualified to write about the comparative law
of bank collections and payment transactions. He is a graduate of the Hebrew University
in Jerusalem, holds an L.L.M. and S.J.D. from Harvard Law School and has been a
visiting professor at the University of Chicago, the University of Illinois, the University
of Cambridge, and law schools in Australia, France and Israel. Professor Geva has
written or co-authored several texts, including a leading treatise on the law of electronic
funds transfers,5 and has published works on the payment systems of several countries.
His experience, practicing law in Canada and working as an advisor to the governments
of several countries on banking and payment systems, has enriched his scholarship. For
example, he provides an informative and accurate description of the structure and
functioning of large value transfer systems not only in the United States, but in six other
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countries and the European Union.6 Few American legal scholars would possess the
requisite knowledge to do so.
The book is divided into four parts. The first, an introduction, gives some
background about the nature of payment transactions and the history and structure of the
payment system that will be useful to practitioners who are unfamiliar with this area of
law. The author explains his objective in comparing the fundamental laws that govern
payment transactions: to try to identify a “universal law merchant” applicable to payment
transactions “transcending the boundaries of the diverse jurisdictions.”7 His premise is
that because “the fundamental needs of payment transactions participants are quite the
same," a universal law merchant exists "to the extent that solutions are common and
pragmatic, so that gaps separating different legal systems are abridged.”8 His
methodology also encompasses an analysis of the ways in which the principles existing in
different legal systems have been adapted to deal with the circumstances of commercial
and financial transactions arising within those jurisdictions.9
The second part of the book compares the juridical relationship between a bank
and its customer in various legal systems, including the account agreement, the nature of
a deposit, the bank’s duty to its customer (referred to as its “mandate” in the civil law
systems), and the manner in which a customer’s current account is determined, including
the bank’s right of setoff. This portion of the book covers some subjects, such as the
determination of the current account, that play a greater role in civil law systems and are
not often given attention in common law jurisdictions.10 It includes a useful comparison
of the extent to which the laws of several countries impose duties of care and good faith
on banks and give force to disclaimers in bank-customer agreements, which can play a
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decisive role in disputes between banks and their customers.11 It also compares in some
detail the banking codes and general conditions that are imposed on the bank-customer
relationship or that establish standards of banking practice in various countries, such as
Canada’s Code of Practice for Consumer Debit Card Services,12 the U.K. Banking
Code,13 and Germany’s General Business Conditions,14 and the extent to which
provisions in bank-customer agreements are susceptible to challenge based on doctrines
of unconscionability and the like. However, American bank attorneys are likely to take
issue with the author’s assertion that “[g]enerally speaking, a businessperson using a
standard form contract is required to point out disclaimers and other onerous terms to
customers.”15
In addressing the nature of the bank deposit, the book somewhat surprisingly
discusses the situs of a bank account and the allocation of political risk only in one brief
paragraph and three footnotes.16 Many of the major conflicts of the 20th century resulted
in trans-national disputes that raised the issue of how to allocate political risk, where the
deposit agreement failed to do so. Examples include the Nazis’ confiscation of bank
accounts of Jews, and other disputes among governments, banks, and their customers that
were brought about by the expropriation of assets during the two World Wars and the
Russian, Mexican and Cuban Revolutions.17 The resolution of these disputes may
depend on whether a bank account is located within the borders of the expropriating
government, and whether the account is in the nature of a loan by the customer to the
bank, a bailment of the customer’s money, or some other right or obligation.
The book’s focus is on comparing a bank’s relationship with its customers, with
other banks, and with third parties to payment transactions in various legal systems.
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Practitioners seeking an in-depth analysis of federal regulation of banking in the United
States generally will not find it a sufficient resource.18
In the third part of the book, Professor Geva analyzes the bank’s performance of
the duties imposed upon it in the collection and payment of checks and other orders for
disposition of funds and in credit transfers; and the effect of a bank’s error in performing
these duties that results in misdelivery of funds. In discussing the bank’s duties to its
customer, the author uses the word “mandate,” a civil law term derived from Roman law
which, however, is the source, in common law countries, of the contractual duty owed by
an agent (in civil law systems, the “mandatary”) to its principal (the “mandator”).
The third part begins with an excellent and concise overview of the common as
well as the distinguishing features of checks and the check collection process under
various national laws.19 The overview is followed by a summary of check legislation in
France, Italy and Israel,20 then by a discussion of the corresponding statutory law in the
U.K., Canada and Scotland.21 Check collection under UCC Article 4 and funds
availability under Federal Reserve Regulation CC are explained.22 The author then
discusses the Geneva Uniform Law for Cheques (“ULC”),23 which is the basis of check
legislation in the civil law countries, then describes deviations from the ULC in
Germany, Italy, Japan, Switzerland and France.24
Lawyers who have had experience with NSF checks will be interested to learn
from the book that two NSF checks in France within 12 months require the drawee bank
to revoke the drawer’s checking authority, to demand the return of all blank checks, and
to withhold all checking privileges for ten years unless the drawer pays a fine.25 Similar
but less draconian laws also exist in Italy and Israel.26
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The book does not include any discussion of check truncation, and mentions
electronic presentment of checks only in passing.27 With the enactment of the Check
Clearing for the 21st Century Act ("Check 21"), effective October 28, 2004,28 check
truncation and electronic check image exchange will become the usual method by which
banks process checks.29 Check truncation permits the exchange of check images in
electronic form as a substitute for the physical delivery of the paper check. It also,
however, means the destruction of the original paper check by the depositary bank or
another bank in the check collection process, making forgery and alteration difficult to
investigate and prove.30 Check 21 will reduce legal impediments to check truncation by
creating a new negotiable instrument called a substitute check, which would be the legal
equivalent of the original check for the purpose of proving payment and would include
most of the information contained on the original check.31
One of the longest sections of the book concerns credit transfers, with an
emphasis on a detailed comparison of the laws of different countries regarding large
value wire transfers. The author is a leading expert on this subject and the book’s
treatment reflects his expertise.
A “credit transfer,” most commonly a wire transfer, can be understood
metaphorically as a “push” transaction, in which a payor, called the “originator,” wants to
“push” funds from its account to the account of a payee.32 The originator instructs its
bank, called the “originator’s bank,” to send funds to the account of the payee, referred to
as the “beneficiary” of the transfer. The instruction is called a “payment order.” The
originator’s bank executes the payment order by sending another payment order to a
“receiving bank.” Payment orders are sent from one bank to another in sequence until a

6

payment order is sent to the beneficiary’s bank, which credits the account of the
beneficiary and notifies it of the payment. Settlement between banks is often made
directly between participating banks through “vostro” and “nostro” accounts or a mutual
correspondent bank. Wire transfers that utilize Fedwire, operated by the Federal Reserve,
as a clearing house are settled by debit and credit on the books of the Federal Reserve
bank or banks. Another clearing house facility is CHIPS, the Clearing House Interbank
Payment System, operated by the New York Clearing House Association, an association
of large New York banks.33 CHIPS is commonly used for cross-border wire transfers,
and settlement is made by posting entries on the accounts of the participating banks at the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
In the section on credit transfers, the author first describes and compares the large
value credit transfer systems in various countries, including the United States,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, France and Germany. The European
Union’s EURO-1 clearing and settlement service is also discussed, as are the laws of
Quebec, Israel, and South Africa to some degree. The book then discusses the legal
nature of a credit transfer, the duties of the parties and the allocation of the risk of loss in
credit transfer systems in these countries.
The book makes clear some significant differences among national laws
concerning loss allocation in credit transfers. In the United States, the originator’s bank
has fulfilled its duty to the originator once it transmits a payment order to an intermediary
bank and that order has been accepted. In contrast, in some other countries such as
Switzerland, the originator’s bank remains legally responsible for the transfer and is
liable for any loss due to delay, error or insolvency until the beneficiary’s bank receives
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the funds. In view of the global nature of the credit transfer system, the extent to which
national laws conflict in allocating the risk of loss is surprising. One is left with the
impression that loss allocation in credit transfers would be an appropriate subject for an
international agreement, although, as the author points out, the Model Law on
International Credit Transfer prepared by UNCITRAL has not been adopted by any
country to date.34
A short section follows on checks and other drafts, such as “payable through” and
“payable at” drafts, drawn on non-depository account holding institutions such as
brokerage firms and insurance companies. Debit cards are mentioned only in passing.
The book does not discuss person-to-person payment systems and non-bank payment
service providers, some of which, such as PayPal, do hold accounts for customers,35 nor
new payment methods such as stored value cards and e-checks.
The final part of the book is a detailed comparison of laws that govern the
allocation of losses resulting from a third party’s fraud that causes an unauthorized
payment. This part is divided into sections dealing with fraud in the issuance of payment
instructions, such as forged checks and unauthorized payment instructions issued by a
defrauder, and sections concerning fraud by a third party that causes misdirection of
funds under payment instructions that were properly issued, such as forged indorsements
of checks and credit transfers to an erroneous or non-existent account.
The final part begins with a convenient summary comparing the rules for
allocation of loss due to a forged drawer’s signature or material alteration of a check in
common and civil law jurisdictions, excluding the United States.36 The summary is
particularly helpful in view of the fact, noted by the author, that the United States is the
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only nation to have adopted specific code provisions on the allocation of forged check
losses; in other common law countries loss allocation is determined according to often
complex general principles of law, and in civil law countries according to general code
provisions not specific to checks.37 The author goes on to compare the rules of different
legal systems regarding modification of loss allocation by contract.
The author’s ensuing discussion of the problem of unauthorized electronic funds
transfers (“EFT’s”) highlights the inconsistencies among loss allocation systems, both
between the treatment of forged checks and unauthorized EFT’s within a legal system,
and across legal systems. He points out that UCC Articles 3 and 4 generally allocate
forged check losses among banks and their customers according to fault in order to
encourage loss prevention,38 but the American statutory system for loss allocation in the
case of unauthorized EFT’s downplays fault, and makes the loss allocation depend on
whether the originating bank used commercially reasonable security procedures,39 or on
whether a consumer provided the debit card, code or other access device to the
perpetrator.40 In contrast, other common law jurisdictions tend to allocate forged check
losses according to loss distribution principles41 but according to agency principles in the
case of unauthorized EFT’s, giving full effect to the concepts of apparent and implied
authority.42 Civil law jurisdictions such as Switzerland take yet a different view, placing
the risk on even the non-negligent customer for forged check losses in most cases43 while
allocating the risk of unauthorized EFT’s on the “mandatary” (originating) bank unless
the loss would not have occurred in the absence of the customer’s negligence.44
The book goes on to provide a comparative analysis of laws on forged
indorsements of checks. On this subject the author explains how the Continental and
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English legal systems, once similar, diverged in the 18th century. The Continental
systems came to recognize the rights of bona fide purchasers to stolen instruments while
the English and American systems preserved the rule that a thief cannot pass title to an
instrument.45 The Geneva U.C.L. expanded the Continental rule.46 However, the AngloAmerican rule, though preserved in the UCC, has been riddled with exceptions for
indorsements by “responsible employees,” impostors, and fictitious and unintended
payees, and altered by a comparative negligence rule where a party’s negligence
substantially contributes to the making of a forged signature on an instrument.47
The book concludes with a section on misdirected credit transfers. A point of
interest is that the United States is the only country other than Germany to have adopted a
code governing electronic funds transfers.48 In other legal systems, disputes concerning
EFT’s are decided according to general principles of law. The discussion of misdirected
credit transfers in general law jurisdictions is perhaps the most original in the book, in the
sense that it presents and analyzes material not collected in other sources. Issues
discussed include inconsistency between the beneficiary’s name and account number,
non-existent or unidentifiable beneficiaries, and resolution of ambiguities and
inconsistencies in the payment order by the beneficiary’s bank contrary to the originator’s
true intention. The author notes a trend toward a “strict compliance” standard in the
interpretation of payment orders, and takes a position contrary to that trend and in favor
of a more flexible approach.
Because the book was intended as a scholarly work, practitioners may find it less
helpful as a practice resource than Professor Geva’s widely-cited treatise on electronic
funds transfers.49 The book’s scope, limited mostly to checks and large value wire
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transfers, will affect its usefulness to some practitioners. The book gives little or no
attention to some of the most common types of payment transactions. Debit cards and
other consumer EFT’s governed in the United States by the Electronic Funds Transfer
Act (“EFTA”)50 and Regulation E51 are discussed only in connection with the disclosure
requirements imposed on banks and their effect on the bank-customer relationship, and
briefly in the section on unauthorized EFT’s. Credit card payments also are not covered
in the book, a major omission in view of the vast and growing volume of credit card
payments and their importance in Internet and cross-bordercommerce. A comparison of
various countries’ laws applicable to credit cards would have been particularly valuable.
The book further omits discussion of automated clearing house (“ACH”)
payments, which include pre-authorized debit and credit transfers such as direct payroll
deposits, direct deposit of Social Security payments, and preauthorized bill payments.
ACH payments are governed by the National Automated Clearing House Association
Operating Rules, which are not discussed.
The book’s structure, centered on the civil law concept of “mandate,” may make
the book difficult to use when researching a specific issue of American law regarding a
payment transaction. Unlike the author’s treatise on electronic funds transfers, the book
does not include practice pointers that might assist practitioners in drafting or negotiating
an agreement involving a payment transaction or in advising clients regarding a problem
or dispute arising out of a payment transaction.
However, despite the book’s academic approach and the necessary limitations in
its scope, it is a scholarly tour de force, and will be valuable to many practitioners who
need to research issues pertaining to cross-border and offshore payments.
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California, where he teaches Commercial Transactions and e-Commerce, Bankruptcy and
Civil Procedure. He is a member of the California, New York and Illinois Bars and a
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The volume of payments by wire transfer over the two principal wire payment systems,

Fedwire and CHIPS, already exceeded one trillion dollars per day as of 1990. See
U.C.C., Article 4A, Prefatory Note; §4A- 101, 55 Fed. Reg. 40,791 (Oct. 5, 1990). By
1996, the average daily volume well exceeded two trillion dollars. Remarks by Federal
Reserve Board Governor Edward W. Kelley, Jr. at the BAI Money Transfer '96
Conference, New York, October 31, 1996. As of 2002, the CHIPS daily volume alone
was over 1.2 trillion dollars, and Fedwire daily volume exceeded one trillion dollars in
the Second Federal Reserve District (New York) alone. See the website maintained by
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York at
http://www.ny.frb.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed43.html. Fedwire is a wire transfer
system operated by the Federal Reserve. CHIPS, the Clearing House Interbank Payment
System, is a privately operated wire transfer system owned by the New York Clearing
House Association, an association of large New York banks, which primarily handles
international funds transfers. These figures do not include transfers through SWIFT (the
Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications), the principal network
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for transfer of funds not denominated in U.S. dollars, or ACH (automated clearing house)
payments. The U.S. gross domestic product in 2002 was about 10.48 trillion dollars.
U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Current Dollar and `Real’
Gross Domestic Product,” 2/27/04, http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn/gdplev.xls.
3

The dollar volume of checks processed by the Federal Reserve System in 2002 totaled

about 15.37 trillion dollars, up slightly from 2001. Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System 89th Annual Report to Congress, April, 2003, Table 8. About 17 billion
checks were processed by the Fed in 2002 (ibid.), a fraction of the total number of checks
issued which is estimated to reach about 60 billion in 2004. 149 Cong. Rec. House 9289
(remarks of Cong. Ford). The number of checks processed has gradually declined since
the 1990’s, but total dollar volume of checks processed has shown moderate increases.
These figures do not include “on-us” checks or checks cleared through other clearing
houses.
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The author recognizes that the bank’s “mandate” and the current account are not often

discussed in common law jurisprudence. Geva, 98, 124. However, he makes the
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consumers of bank services. See, generally, Jerry Markham and Lissa Broome,
Regulation of Bank Financial Service Activities (St. Paul: West Group, 2001); Jonathan
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Paul: West Group, 2002).
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Geva states at one point that “[e]lectronic presentment, and hence, cheque truncation, is

authorized by statute in the USA, UK and Australia.” Geva, 133. See also id., 168 n.
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Israel, and that authority for electronic presentment recently was added in South Africa.
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Viz. the remarks of Fred Redeker, President and CEO of the National Clearing House
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In contrast, payment by check is a “debit transfer,” metaphorically a “pull” transaction.
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subject of some controversy. The process of settlement of transactions involving
accounts held by payment service providers can be entirely internal to the service
provider and unregulated by any statute or regulatory agency. For example, if a buyer
uses a credit transfer to deposit funds in his PayPal account, then uses the funds to
purchase goods from a seller that has instructed PayPal to send him a check for the
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